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Hidden treasure: The Italian war economy's 
contribution to the German war effort, 
(1943-1945) 
Dr. Timothy D. Saxon (Etat-Unis) 
Introduction 
Gerhard Schreiber has described the German conquest, occupation. and 
exploitation of Italy in 1943 as the Wehrmacht's "last victory" of the Second 
World War.' Hi s description is correct in that the German seizure o f Fascist 
Italy produced a substantial economic windfall that material ly assisted Ger-
many in continu ing the Second World War until the economic collapse of 
Hitler's Reich. Italy, even after the bitter war years from 1940-1943, remai-
ned a prize 1V0rth winning. The German conquest and subsequent economic 
exploitation of Italy raise a variety of important questions, inspired in part by 
Peter Lieberman's book, Does Conquest Pay? Why did a society as natio-
nalistic and modern as Italy cooperate with the German occupation? What 
factors all owed the Germans to extract a signifi cant material advantage from 
their occupation? Did this explo itation of Ital y inspire resistance or were 
other factors more important in the thinking of Italians who chose to fight the 
German occupation? Does the Italian experience during World War II have 
any current relevance to potential con flicts around the globe? 2 
Strategic Considerations of the Italian Campaign 
Italy occupied a central place in Allied strategy after the M ay 1943 de-
feat of Axi s forces in Tunisi a. Removing Fascist Italy from the war would 
eliminate the only power direct ly supporting the German war effort with 
a significalll number of troops in the Europea n theate r. Italian troops, large 
numbers of whom had been kill ed and captured in North Africa and Russia. 
still defended parts of the Balkans, Greece, and southern France against Al-
lied invas ion. M oreover, removing Italy from the war might undermine the 
continued participation of Hungary and Romania as Axi s allies as well as head 
off potential Turkish moves favoring the Axis. ' Spanish and Swiss support for 
Germany might also be reduced in the event an Allied conqu es t of Italy. 
Removing Ital y from the war also offered the chance to stri ke a sting ing 
econom ic blow to the German war effort. When German offi cials su rveyed 
the It<lli<ln economy in M ay. J 943, a surprising picture of the Italian war eco-
nomy emcrgcd ." M<ljor General Hans Henri ci. a member of the German eco-
nomic SLaff in Ital y, told Allicd illterrog:Jlors arter the IVaI' that German au tho-
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ritie, learned that northern Ital y had "a sufli c ient number of highly modern 
factories" and " the best and Jllost Illodern Illachincs of Gcrman , A mcrican and 
Sw iss origin." M oreo ver, large numbers of highl y-sk ill cd indust ri al work ers 
li vcd in northern Italy, where German adm inistrators could draw upon th em 
iO su pport th e Gcrman war error!.' Italy's petroleulll production fac iliti cs and 
na va l sh ipyards were located in northern Italy as we re .so me twcnt y -sevc n 
aircraft rac tories and sixty -four arm s and munitions works." Although total 
Italian induslI'ial output aillounted to only 2.7 percent o f world production in 
1939, [{aly's industrial base was a considerable prize if added to Germany's 
10.7 percent of workl produc tion? 
Why didn't Alli ed strateg ic pl an nCJ"s cons ider th e economic potential of 
northern hal y when drafting their plans to eliminate that nation from the war') 
A llied forces needed to approach Ital y from North Africa via Sicil y and then 
to the heel of the boo t-shaped Itali an peninsula. Short-ranged Alli ed fighter 
aircra ft imposed an absolute li m it on possibl e invasion sites, given that the 
German Luftwaffe , whi ch Ulli'a intelligen ce tracked closel y, still packed a po-
tent punch in the M ed iterranean theater. Moreover, th e Germans had retained 
most of their armor and Jllotorized forces in northern Italy , which meant the 
farther north the Allies landed , the more powerfu l the initial German counte-
ratt ack aga inst the Allied beachhead was likely to be'" A plan calling for th e 
landing o f the American 82nd Airborne Division near Rome was the boldest 
Allied proposal of an otherwi se unimag inative and un inspired campaign. 
When German force le ve ls increased in the Rome area, General Dwight D . 
Ei senhower cance lled the landing at the las t minute on 8 September 1943, 
effectively eliminating any All ied attempt to contest German y fo r control of 
northern and central Italy at an ear ly stage in the ca mpai gn." 
Conquest: Operation Achse 
The coded message, "Bring in the Harvest. " initi ated Operation Aehse, 
the German scenario for an Itali an su rrend er and Al lied invasion of Ital y in 
September 1943 .'" The message was an altoge ther appropriate one gi ven what 
followed. German forces quickly seized control of Ital y's transportati on hubs 
including ports, roads , and railn)ads, oft en aga inst stiff Italian res istance . II 
Erwin Rommel' s plan, predicated on an Allied in vasion of Italy as far north 
as Rome, call ed for German forces to abandon sou thern It aly and fall b,lCk at 
least as far as the Italian cap ital. A lbert Kesselring's decision to disregard this 
plan by res isting at Sa lerno and conducting a fi ghti ng withd rawal to the Liri 
V al Icy line south or Rome wa, onc of the war's most important strategic de-
cisions. Not onl y did the Ccrl1lans retain control o r north ern Ital y'S indust rial 
base, the y also preventcd the estab lishmcn t of the U.S.A.A.F. 's Fiftecn th A ir 
l~orce on forward bascs from whi ch it would h;l ve hee n ahl e to homb targcts 
deep in E<1stcrn Europe more cilect ively than th ey cou ld from the Foggia air-
licld compl ex decp in southern Italy.,e 
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(Jcrl11,ln plallncl's, who had hee n operating in Munich since earl y August 
undel' the cover name of "'Economi c Sta1l AschofL" pursued two part icul ar 
goal s in th e early stages of th e takeover. Hav ing surveyed the po tential boos t 
to German war production that ass imilating Itali an industry offered, '3 planners 
wanted to integrate Italian factori es and farms into the Cerman war economy 
qui ck ly and effi c ient l y They also wanted to keep th e A llies from seiling Ita-
ly's industrial capacit y, something that be tter lit w ith Kesse lring's deve loping 
strateg y than ROlllmel's plans to abandon much or the Italian peninSUla. 
Economic Staff Aschoff' s plans and ac tions after Operation Achse played a 
critical role in restoring Itali an war prod uction ." 
A n urgent meet ing held on 17 Scptember 1943 discllssed the necessity 
of pUlling the Italian economy back to work. Parti cipants clearly unde rstood 
th at reaching this goal required several steps . First, German ad min istra tors 
needed to put an Italian admini strative structure in place that could assume 
respon sibil i ty for supervis ion orthe Italian economy. Second , the meeting' s 
partic ipants, who made no attempt to cover th e purpose of restori ng the func-
tioning of the Italian economy, lea rned that Italy wou ld suffe r the same fate as 
other occu pied states. Minutes recorded th at. desp ite th e presence o f Italian 
representatives from the Bank of Italy, Al fa Romeo, and other Italian con-
cerns, "[e lxperi ence has shown clearly that the explo itat ion of foreign coun-
tries is poss ible only when the loca l admini strati ve and economi c instituti ons 
are made use ful in th e quickest way poss ible for the area's own requirements ." 
Finall y, partiCipants noted that military security and mobility requ ired the res-
toration of itali an infrastructure to working status as quick ly as possible. ls 
Shortl y thereafter Army Group B 's commander establi shed a com mittee 
(ltalien ische Wirtschaftskomitee beim Deutschen Oberbefehlshaber) to direct 
the Italian economy wi th seven members named by hi s Repl'esentative for 
Direc ti on of the Economy (Beauft rag ter fur die Wirtschaftsfuhrung). The 
Committee worked <lt the PI'ov incial Economi c Coun cil's offi ce in M i lan and 
had responsibility for estab li sh ing food, price, and wage policies for Itali an ci-
vilians, direction of the eco nomy in the Army Group's area, and repo l1ing the 
economy's requircments. The German ad ministration would enforce cu rrent 
economic laws, althou gh changes could be ordered by the Arm y Group com-
mander. O n 12 September 1943, Hitler had as signed Albert Speer sole res-
pons ibility fo r arms production in Il<d y. The Committee there fore noted th at 
questions con ce rning armaments were to be direc tly cont rolled by the Specia l 
Representative of the Reich's Minister fo r Armamcnts and War Producti on 
(So nderbe<lu l'tragter des Rcichsministcrs fur Bcwallnung und Kriegsproduk -
tion ), who initiall y focused on restOl"ing motor vehicle pmdllction, an area of 
st rengt h gi ven the pre se nce of A lra ROllleo, Fiat. and ot her wc ll-know n Italian 
ve hicl e producers in nonhcrn Ital y.'" 
Lagging coa l del iveries co nstilLlt ed an i lllmcdiate problem hilllkring 
les lOration of i'ull pmduction. In A ugu st I <)4:1. a month before the Itulian su r-
render. of th e: on e milli on ton s or coal Germ any had agreed to supply lO Ital y, 
oilly 700 .()OO tons arrived. The reducti on or coa l shipments in the chaos after 
the German takeover almost cr ippled producti oll. and sho rtfall s of I-ubbcr. 
iron. o il shipments al so had to be made good. The lac k or coal and centrali zed 
plan nin g put se riou s lilllit s on Italian product ion in September 1943 '7 The 
situati on improved in October 1943 as co,lI deli ve ri es increased to I AOO,()OO 
tons. nincty-three pc rcent o f th e targe t. German authori ties dramati ca ll y red u-
ced the target in N ovember 1943 to 400 ,000 tons , o f wh ich 385 ,000 were deli -
vered. Coa l delivers slow ly ro~e in early 1944 on ly to collapse in the late 1044 
to 100,000 tons. less than a fon y percent o f the promised 250,000 ton s." 
The Germ an occupati on of Italy un covere.d large stockpiles of raw ma-
tel-ials that Itali an industri ali sts had carefull y hoarded in hopes of being th e 
first to initi ate consumer product ion at the war 's end_ Field Marshal Albert 
Kesse lring reported th at he believed th e Ital ia ns had pursued "a deliberate 
poli cy o f hoarding quite beyond my compre-hension . The di scovery. afte r the 
defection o f th e Italians in 1943, o f vast stores of unused wa r material is alone 
suffi cient proof o f thi s cheese -pari ng " '" M aj or General Hermann Burkhart 
Mueller-Hille brand eonli rmed after the IVar that Italian industria li sts had en-
gaged in hoard ing. 
Italy_ for instance. would make coulllerrequests for large quan titi es o f 
r,1\V materi als alld coal. In thi s connection , moreover , as w as di scovered aft er 
th e defect ion o f Iwly in September, 1943 when the Italian armament indu stry 
was more str ictl y controlled by German agencies , the Itali an govern ment had 
never becn in Cull control of its indu stri es. Raw materi als sent fro m Germany 
for armament purposes were found hoarded for pos t-war pu rposes. "~" 
German offi cials used some of these raw materi als in I w li an factories 
and assigned nlaterial reshipment to Germany , w hi ch began the day of the 
German takeover. hi gh pri ori ty in the adm inist ra ti on o f the Italian industrial 
base . ~ ' In Se[l tcm ber and October 194:1 alone, some 6~.200 tons of raw mate-
ria ls we re transport ed back to Gerlll 'ln y.~~ 
Desp itc this hiddcn wealth of materials . Il<l lian offi c ials had requested 
increased r,l w- mate rial shipments up to the I ta li an surrender in September 
1943. Gi vcn thi s situati on. i t can he argued that the 11<1 li an co llapse rendcred 
,1 significant se l'vi ce to th e German wa l' erfort . Ge rm ,lny gained contro l over 
Itali an produ ction and r,IIY matel'ial caches after the Italian surrendcr. GC I'man 
control o f It alian producti on fac ilit ies permittcd th e dcterminati on or the Itil-
li an war industry's true ra w mate ri al rcquircment s and allo lVed the translCr 0: 
cxcess ra w mate rials b,lC k to Gcrma n y . ~ ; 
Thc di scove ry o f hoal-ded ra IV Il l<llC rial s challenges interpretat ions of 
It,ilian economic weakness as l e~ lIltin g i'rom the silortage of such goods. 
Whil c Italian ,1I'I11 S producers coul d not m<Hch German production in te rms 
of lO tal Olll[lliL Itali an factori es could have si gnili cantl y increased armament 
product ion duri ng the Second World War using materi als stockpiled by Ita-
li an industri alist s. Ev id ence suggests that the low levels of Italian produ ction 
stemmed more from weak state contro l o f the indu stri al sector than it d id fm m 
a shortage of r,l IV materials. Lucio Ceva and Giorgio Rochat note th at " in 
September 1943 the Germans se ized three times as much steel as was availa-
ble in 1940. " The return of su ch raw ma terial s to Germany materiall y ass isted 
the rapid expansion of Germ an war produ cti on in late 194:1 and earl y 1 944 .~' 
Mussolini's lac k of control over Italy 's war industries lay at the root 
of the Itali an economic failure in W orld War II . One scholar descr ibes th e 
Ital ian effu rt at mobil izi ng nati onal resou rces d lIri ng the Second World W ar 
as 't r iAing ' when compared with that of the First W orld W ar. An ex aminati on 
o f economic fi gul-cs bears out thi s asserti on. Stephen Harvey notes that 
ce rtain non-strateg ic industries were virtu all y un affec ted by the war: 
pri vate ex pend iture on fu rn iture fo r ex ample was 5.837,000,000 I ire ( 1939 va-
lues) in 1939 and had dropped only sli ghtl y to 5,2 82 .000,000 lire in 1942. It is 
illuminatin g to compare nati onal economic in ves tment in the Fi rst W orl d W ar 
w ith that in the Sccond World W ar. Stat isti cs for the ratio bet ween consump-
ti on and in vestment show that mobilizati on o f nati onal resources 1939-45 was 
tr iAingcompared to 19 15-1 8: 
19 15 -7.8 
19 16 -2 1.9 
191 7 -:10_2 
191 8 - :10.9 
1940 +5.7 
1941 +6.8 
1942 +2.9 
1943 - /.2"' ; 
M oreover, as recent research affi rms. no shortage of raw materi als pre-
c ipi ta ted Italy'S poor productio n record and eventual defeat. What exp lains 
Fasci st Italy'S pOO!' perform<lJ1ce') Mu sso lini's government failed to impose a 
stri ct reg ime demanding max imum production . This fai lure to contro l Italian 
producers. not a dire short age of raw materials . constitutes the primary econo-
mi c fa ct or contri butin g to Italian dereat in t'he Second World War.~ (' . 
A lbe rt Speer. German ministcr o f arJllalll ents and war product ion, quic-
kly and cnCl'ge tically reol'gani zed Italian arms manufacturing. Hi s efforts, 
combined w ith th ose o r ot her Germ an ad mi nis trators of the It ali,1I1 w ar eco-
nomy. resulted in Italy contributing nea rly liftecn-plus perce nt of tota l Ger-
man war producti on dUI'ing 1944. ~7 Betwee n April and Oc tober 1944, Cerm an 
represcnt ,ltivcs pu rc hased some RM 290.()OO,0()() worth of goods from Italian 
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industry. Purchases or consumer goods and textiles. whi ch alone WCI"e valued 
at some RM 30(U)OO,()()(). ilided the German wa r elTort by relieving pressurc 
on German factories that increasingly focused on arms production." Although 
iron orc product ion sank l'I'om Wj S,77 3 tons in 1943 to 390.4~3 tons in 1044, 
Italy still provided signilicant amounts of aiuminulll , mercury, linc, copper, 
and manganese ores for production'"'! Iron production sank from (i4~,()OO 
lOns (I (43) to 232,038 tons (1944). as did stee l production, which fell from 
1,727.20 I tons ( 1(43) to I ,()26, I 93 tons ( 1944 l, wh ich was not as i mponant 
as it may lirst see lll, given that large stock pile of iron and stee l existed in Ita-
lian warehouses in 1943 .11) Italian factories also Illanufactured fu ses_ cartridge 
and shell casings, long-barre led antitank and antiaircraft guns, and vehicles, 
all of which were in short supply." Itali an raw materi al stockp iles helped pre-
vent bottlenecks that had hindered output in both Germany and other occupied 
countries until late in 1944.'2 
The German war effort also benefi ted from control o f northern Ital y 's 
ri ch agri culrural regions, especia ll y the fertile Po Valley)' A German survey 
of Italian agricul tural surpluses reponed on 2 September 1943 that northern 
Italy could supply 249,180 tons of ric e, 76,900 tons of corn (Maisl, and 
165.700 ton s of potatoes.'J This massi ve surplus meant that Germany could 
supply a good portion of it s agricultural needs from nonhern Italy, feed its 
troops fighting there, and release German farmers either to fight or produce 
arms. A steady stream of agric ultural produce Rowed from the provi nces of 
uppel' Italy to Germany and to Wehrm ac ht forces fightin g in occupied Italy. 
By December 1943, Italian farillers had provided 41,500 tons of rice to Ger-
many. In 1944. Italian fields. orchards, and vi neyard s supplied wheat, ri ce. 
corn, oats. rye. potatoes, sugar, fruit, vegetables, meat , fat. fi sh. and wine for 
German eon s urnption .' ~ In just the last three months of 1944. food shipments 
from northern Italy to the Reich totaled approximately 82.500 tons. '~ 
Th e German war economy similarly benefited from the large poo l of 
,killed Italian labor. Italians worked in th e factories of nonhern Italy or as 
forced labor in Germany. While Nazi labor authorities shipped some skilled 
Italian laborers from the great industrial belt of northern Italy to Germany, 
the majority of sk illed workel's remained in It alian faClories producing goods 
vital to the Gerl11an warellon until Gerl11any ' s war economy co llapsed during 
the wintcr of 1944-1945 . Moreover, German authorities employed Italian 
Illilit,i\'y internees captured in 1943 as slave labor. Estimates of their IlUm-
bers have ranged fro lll ()OO,OOO to 1.000,000. Many Italian workers labored 
under horr ible conditions, wh ilc interned mel11bers of the Il<il ian armed forces 
suflCred virtual ensl ave mcnt as German authorities treated them in the same 
fashion ,IS Sov iet pri so ners or war. The difficulties under which internees 
lahored contributed to ;In cstimated 40,000 deaths among th cm.'; 
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Thc conljucq of Itill y yielded Gerl11any substantial gains includillg stock-
piles of raw materi als. modern industrial plant. large pools of skilled labor. 
and agricultural production, all locatcd c lose to thc li ghling front, which subs-
tantially boosled the output of the German war economy. Although optimal 
performance was never achieved, the occupation and exp loitation of Iialy 
more than paid th e conque rors' costs. 
RESISTANCE 
According to Peter Lieberman 's "l ogic of resistance ... ruthless con-
querors should bc able to compel the political and economic collaboration of 
defeated societies at low cos!."'" The German experience in Italy confirms this 
theoretical assertion in many ways. The occupation of I taly required the use 
of large numbers of German troops, which fou nd dual employment in both 
internal security and defense roles. Lieberman's argument tha t "expectat ions 
of liberation - for example - if the occupier is embroiled in a closely fought 
international war - can heighten res ista nce and reduc e co llaboration " also 
is confirmed by events in Italy"" Although Itali an resistance increased as it 
becamc apparent that Germany was losing the wa r. the Germans made gre at 
gains in return for a security investment that they would have had to make 
anyway. 
Resistance to the war and the costs that it imposed on Italian society be-
gan long before the 5 March 1943 worker< strike at Ihe enormous Fiat Mira-
for i factory complex in Turin. which Mussolini bl amed on Italian communists . 
The str ike spread throu ghout the indust r ia l regions of northern Ital y, inspired 
in part by the loss of large numbers of troops from the Italian Eighth Army in 
Ru ss ia, which lUrned passive resistancc into open opposition to Mussolini' s 
regime.'" The si tu ation was severe enough to become a topic of disc ussion at 
one of Hi tler ' s FLihrc r confel'ences that month .JI 
After th e German takeover. strikes continued. By the fall of 194J. the 
economic situation for Italian workers had worsened. and strikes were repor-
ted in Turin . The issue behind a 17 November 1943 strike by 15,000 workers 
in two Fiat factories was rationing. Itali an workers comp lained th at German 
aUlhorities had provided too little food and that the y encountered problems 
procuring thc rations that they were owed . Moreover, food prices were rising 
much faster than wages. Price for staples in the Italian diet such as olive oil, 
beans . and [last,1 climbed between 300-400 percent during 1944-1945. A si -
mil ar silUatio n like w ise made it all but impossible to obtain c lothing or shoes. 
Gcrman admini strators wa nted to improve the si tuation and reponed that they 
needed to make sure that workers' canteens had suffic ient food to serve for 
lunches at the factories ·le 
The si tuation would not improve in 1044. The cost of li ving in the Ila -
liull Soc iall~ e[luhlic rosc from a leve l oi'4J6 in January to GI7 in Dece mber " 
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In early 1944, stri\; es lOok on Illore of" pol i tical tonc dcspite Ixotest signs still 
l'oillp lain ing that Italian work ers' l ations comparcd unfavorably w ith thosc 
or ot iler occup ied nations. A walkout hy 50,000 industr ia l wmkns in Genoa 
escalated into ,1 violent confrontation that led to the shootin gs or two German 
oUicers and the perfunctory exec ution ofeigilt Italians in reprisal. Only thc ar-
rival of armed po li ce reinforceillents stabi lil.ed the situation:" Earl y in March, 
the work stoppages culmi nated in a ge neral strike ca lled by the COllll11 inee 
for National Liberation (CLN,), w hi ch was supported by a million I ta li an 
workers w ho laid down their too ls for eight days " 
Leaders of th e Italian res istance wished to make the general strike a test 
of strength w ith the Germans, Italian partisans halted bus and rail lines in th e 
area, preventing the movemen t or workers and goods. The Germans respon -
ded ill kind, Field Marshal Kcsse lring dispatched troops to northern Italy to 
support SS units and Itali an Fasc ist militia in arresting and sp iriting away labor 
leaders to que ll th e demonstra tions. Hitler initi all y demanded the deportation 
of twenty percent of I talian laborers in northern Italy to Germany, something 
that Dr. Rudolph Rahn, Gel'man Ambassador to Mussol ini' s Italian Soc ial 
Repub li c, vehementl y opposed on the grounds that the resulting dec line in war 
prod ucti on was exact ly w hat I ta lian resistance movemen ts wanted , Rahn also 
feared that Hitler 's repressi ve policy wou ld cause work ers to go over to the 
part isans in large numbers, something that had not he l-etofore occu n-ed_'" 
Beyond the hindrance of strikes, two other factors slowed down indus-
trial recovery, A llied air raids, which Itali an industr ialists blamed \'vhenever" 
l)I'oducti on sho rtfall took place, and a growin g coa l shortage th at gripped Italy 
as it did Germany in the fa ll and winter of 1944-1945 contributed to the gra -
dual dec line of Italian outpu t. Italian workers turncd air raids warnings into 
lengthy pauses in the ir work, the on ly effec ti ve GCI"ll1an response to wh ich 
was paymem of bonuses for work ers w ho n~mained at theil' machines during 
the raid sl'? Nonetheless, despite the problems o f stl-iking workers, shortages 
o f critical raw materials, and Allied air raids. th e Germans did not lose conrro l 
of Italian indust ry until the co llapse of the German war eeonom)'_ 
Collapse 
Allied air force leaders finally hit upon thc COITec t manner or attacking 
the German W,lr economy in Septembcr 1944, Air Ch ici' Marshal Sir Arthur 
Tedder, with the assi stance or opcrat ional re sea rch spec iali st. Sol ly Z ucke r-
l11an. had argued before Operati on Overlord that th e kcy to the German war 
ecollo l11Y was it s ra il system , wh ich de li ve red parts to Germall f;lCtmies d is-
persed to render A lli ed bOl11bing incfkctivc, and coa l. which lVas the pril11ary 
ruel uscd by (Jerman homes and industry. Tedder ;Intl Z Uckerl11,lll <ll'gucd 
ve hemently that only hy homhing critie;1i railro;ld marshalill !2- ya r(/'; in h ;lnce, 
8e lgium , <I nd Cnl11:lny cou ld Allied air rOIH'S both par;IIYlc the n1< )VeI11('n t (I f 
reinrorcelllent s to Normandy and ensure the eventual collapse or the (;e rm iln 
war economy." 
T edde r and Zu ckCl"lllan were co rrect. Sustai ned attenti on by Allied bom-
bers to the complex and Ilot easily repa ircd ma rshallin g ya rd s in September 
and Oc tober 1944 paralyzed the transport of both goods and coa!.'" A ncr the 
war_ A Ibcrt Speer argued that the collapse of the German rai I sys tem ulti mately 
cau .'icd the collapse or the vast German war economy. T he campaign's effect 
upon Italy was immediate and irremcdiable. German coa l deliveries dropped 
frolll 273,000 ton s in August ( fony-seven pelcent of target) to 100 ,000 tons 
in October (fony percent of target),\O In January 1944, 150.000 rai l cars had 
been available for shi pping goods, By January 1945 , that number had fallen 
to 41 ,OOO ,~ 1 By early 1945, fuel and amm uniti on, al ready in short supp ly by 
the sUlllmer of 1944, were no longer shipped f rom the Reich to Italy. German 
forces in Italy thereafte r relied so lely upon Italian production for small arms 
and ammu nition, Although neither rati ons nor clothing supplies ever en tirely 
disappeared. fuel shortages restricted vehic le traffi c to just eigh ty kil ometers 
movement during the final Allied offensive_ When A llies broke finally broke 
through the German line at Bologna in Apri l 1945, the German Fourteenth 
Army abandoned all of i ts eq uipment. Its siste r force, the Tenth Army, lost 
half its eq uipment in th e helter-skelter rush from Italy,\1 
It is wel l worth noting that production in Italy tinall y halted because of 
the economic col lapse in Germany and resul ted from neither the destruction 
o f the Italian industri al base nor resistance to the German occupation. Ger-
man ga ins in Italy far exceeded the investmenr of Illen and coerc i ve force that 
maintaining Italian production for th e duration of the war. 
Conclusions 
The economi c value or northern Italy to the German wa r effort was 
eno rmous_ Whether in the fOI-m captured weapons used to reti t divisions for 
co mbat or roodstuffs that fed Germans in the wo rst days of the war, occupied 
northern Italy made a v ital contribut ion to the German war effo rt from 1943 to 
1945 still not fu ll y grasped_" As Germany retreated from the Ukraine, Poland, 
France, Belgium, and cri ti ca l bOl"der regions such as Si lesia and the Sa,1I", the 
Italian contri buti on to the German war economy rose proportionally , A t the 
least, it is worth not ing that w ithout It alian prod uc tion , the Gerl11an armi es 
fightin g in i ta ly could not have sustained their campaigns there_ By late 1944 
and ea rl y 1945, rhe I ta li an the<l tcr had become autarkic, depe nding on Italian 
productioll alonc to cOlltinuc the co nl1ict. 
T he Germ an experience se izil1g and integrating the I talian cconomy du-
ring the Second World W al' c lcarl y reinforces Peter L icbe rm an's th es is that 
a ruthl ess state can suhsw ntial ly profit fl"Ol11 the con(juest of modern indus-
tr ial nations_ Lichennan S<I)'s that sOl11e 1'01"111 or co llaborati on is nccessary jf 
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a ruthless state hopes to effici ently ex plOit a conquered n'lli Oll. Many Italians 
cast their lot with the Germans, guided hy private interest in lllaintaininQ 
either their assets or their in comes. While this cooperation with German;' 
might be atlributab le to the creat ion of th e It alian Socia l Republi c under Mus-
solini, it quickly became c lear to Italians that the new reg illle retained littl e 
contro l ove r Italy. When Italian indu str iali sts, workers, and farmer'S cOIl tinued 
production , they fully grasped that Germany would be the pri me ben enc iary 
or their effort s. 
Is w hat we lea rn fmm the Italian ex perience in World War Jl of use to-
day'l Recent events in Taiwan. where an attempted assass inati on of the rulin g 
party leadership threw the island into turmoil and led to threats of intervention 
by the People 's Republi c o f China, suggest that the question 'Does conquest 
pay')' is an important one in international relati ons. W ould a Chinese con-
quest of Taiwan assist thi s nation in rea li zing its ambition to assen power as 
a regional hegemon and/or a global power') Whil e Chinese GDP is currently 
estimated as the second largest in the world at $5 ,989,000,000.000, trailing 
on ly th e United States at $10,450,000.000.000, Taiwan ranks twenty-third 
at $406,000,000 .000 or seven percent o f Chinese GDP." Given that man y 
Taiwanese already have made maj or investments in the mainland China 
econo my and share a common nationality wi th the potential conqueror. the 
suggestion that the conquest of Taiwan might be eco nomi ca ll y prontable to 
the People's Republic of China is not hard to belie ve . • 
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